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COMMENTARY
Productive justice and compulsory
service
Alex Sager*
Philosophy and University Studies, Portland State University, Portland, OR, USA
This paper is part of the Special Issue: Book symposium on Debating Brain Drain: May Government
Restrict Emigration? More papers from this issue can be found at http://www.ethicsandglobalpolitics.net
In her contribution to Debating Brain Drain, Gillian Brock defends the contentious
position that poor but legitimate states may take coercive measures to restrict the
emigration of skilled workers.1 This position can be challenged on empirical and on
normative grounds. Brock’s case for compulsory service rests on three empirical
claims: (1) the departure of skilled citizens directly or indirectly exacerbates
deprivation; (2) the gains from emigration (e.g. through remittances, skill transfer,
etc.) do not compensate for losses; and (3) if states demand compulsory service from
skilled workers, then this will reduce the deprivation. If any of these claims are false,
it will be difficult to mount a case for emigration restrictions.2 From a normative
perspective, even if it is established that the emigration of skilled workers significantly
contributes to deprivation, human rights and principles of justice may prevent states
from justly restricting citizens’ freedom to leave.3
I am sympathetic to both empirical and normative challenges and will attempt to
show why by situating emigration restrictions under productive justice, the branch of
justice that investigates how goods and services ought to be produced. Lucas Stanczyk
frames productive justice around the question: ‘How are the goods whose distribution
justice governs to be produced in the first place? By whom, in what quantity, and on
what terms?’4 For Brock and for Stancyzk, ensuring productive justice sometimes
justifies coercive measures to compel people to produce goods and services. I argue
that the choice to concentrate on state measures to restrict workers’ liberties so that
they produce desired goods and services is unduly narrow and shortsighted from
an empirical perspective and falls short on important dimensions of productive
justice.
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Since Marx, much of the normative discussion around productive justice has
centered on the work conditions and on worker compensation.5 (A paradigmatic
topic today is the conditions and wages of workers in international manufacturing.)
Nien-Hê Hsieh’s recent survey of justice in production fits squarely in this tradition
by calling for liberal egalitarians to more fully articulate criteria for meaningful work
and for worker participation (e.g. through workplace democracy).6 Implicit in this
approach is that production itself is not a major moral problem, as firms will produce
goods when consumers demand them.
In contrast, Brock and Stanczyk’s approach to productive justice focuses on the
state measures, including compulsory service, to improve welfare for the community
at large.7 Instead of states simply providing a framework of rights and liberties to
guarantee just working conditions and fair wages, they see productive justice as
sometimes requiring that states compel some workers to produce for the greater
good. Built into this approach is the empirical assumption that markets fail to
provide needed goods and services and that positive incentives are insufficient to
correct these market failures. There are two dangers with this approach. Empirically,
we risk misunderstanding the conditions that need to be in place for an adequate
provision of goods and services. Normatively, we should not only care whether goods
and services are available but we also need to inquire into how they are produced (e.g.
are the rights of workers respected?).
Consider first the empirical problem. We should be very cautious about advocating
compulsory service and the restriction of emigration unless there is clear evidence
that it will be effective. Surprisingly, the empirical literature provides almost no
evidence for a causal relationship between compulsory service and better health
outcomes.8 For example, Seble Frehywot’s 2010 survey article of compulsory service
programs for health workers mainly develops a typology of compulsory programs
without rigorous assessment of whether these programs work. The section on
outcomes reports anecdotal evidence that some compulsory service programs may
lead health workers to reside in underserved regions, but the authors admit that ‘No
rigorous study has systematically compared rural and remote workforce disparities in
countries with compulsory service to those in countries that don’t have such
programs.’9 Compulsory service programs might have the desired effects in some
cases but more is needed than the possible efficacy to justify compulsion: the burden
of proof rests on those who wish to restrict emigration. This burden of proof requires
not only showing that compulsory service programs have the desired effects but also
demonstrating that these programs are significantly more effective than other non-
coercive measures such as voluntary incentive-based programs.10
Beyond this lack of evidence, there are theoretical reasons to believe that
compulsory service programs are unlikely to be successful. It is a mistake to examine
dimensions of productive justice in isolation. When we think about a policy
intervention, we posit a causal model. As Nancy Cartwright has stressed, when
constructing a causal model we need to identify the causes introduced by the policy
that will contribute to the desired outcome, think about how they will work in
combination, and reflect on the background conditions (auxiliary factors) necessary
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for the effect to occur. Moreover, when trying to understand how causes will operate,
mechanisms matter.11
A single model will not helpfully elucidate a complex, multidimensional goal such
as productive justice. Nonetheless, it is useful to begin thinking about how one might
do so. To simplify somewhat, let’s consider the area that has received the most
attention in the ‘brain drain’12 debates: the shortage of health care services in some
of the world’s least developed countries. The desired outcome is that the population
receives an adequate level of health care. The proposed policy intervention is to
compel workers who acquired the ability to provide these services in these countries
to remain and work in their profession. This policy intervention rests on a causal
claim: compelling workers (e.g. through compulsory service) to remain and work will
at least partially alleviate health care shortages.
To assess this policy intervention, we need to ask about the causal mechanism and
about the auxiliary factors that are needed to realize the desired outcome. I follow
Cartwright in identifying mechanisms with the answer to the question: ‘How would
the policy variable bring about the desired effect?’ (Cartwright 2008: 35) The
mechanism posited by compulsory service is that people compelled to remain will
work to increase the quantity of health services and thereby move the country closer
to an adequate level of healthcare.
At this stage, we should raise a number of questions about the proposed
mechanism. Will workers compelled to remain in fact provide health services? Will
would-be emigrants who have been compelled to stay have opportunities to work?
Will they be motived to work? Do recent graduates possess the skills to effectively
provide services, especially in local conditions that may differ greatly from those
encountered in their training? Will their clinics have the resources necessary
(electricity, clean water, medications, etc.) to deliver services? Will the population
that needs these services have access to these clinics? Will corruption or violence
interfere with the provision of services? Will the expectation of compulsory service
create a disincentive for people to pursue education in health care? A negative
response to the first six questions or a positive response to the last two will cast doubt
on the efficacy of the policy measure.
These questions about the proposed policy interventions are connected to
background conditions and to causal complexes. All outcomes are produced by
multiple causes that jointly bring about desired effects. The provision of health care
services rests on a combination of material, political, and social conditions that must
be in place. This casts doubts on the efficacy of compulsory service without other
substantial, concurrent reforms. Dimensions of productive justice such as the
provision of medical services are realized together with other goods and services*
health care professionals only deliver services when they have reliable means of
transportation, supplies, facilities, rule of law, and a regime of rights and liberties that
enables them to pursue their work.
In fact, Brock’s policy recommendation*compulsory service*may very well be at
odds with the conditions needed to realize productive justice. Brock stresses that only
legitimate states that respect core civil and political rights can justly impose
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emigration restrictions.13 This should not be seen only as a normative prerequisite;
compulsory service is also unlikely to have positive results in areas where civil and
political rights are absent. Countries that have approximated a reasonable level of
productive justice (e.g. enough goods are produced under reasonably just conditions
for human flourishing)14 do so in large part by upholding institutions such as rule of
law, secure property rights, and checks and balances against government.15 Leaving
aside normative concerns for a moment, the guarantee of the rights of individual
workers, including the right to exit, is generally not in tension with productive justice
but rather a necessary condition in a prosperous regime. Notably, proposals for
compulsory service not only prevent workers from leaving the country but also
prevent them from responding to incentives within the country. Without exit rights,
skilled workers are unable to adequately react to market forces in their job choices
and to engage in entrepreneurship, plausibly stymying innovation and institution
building. Furthermore, without emigration rights, societies are less able to take
advantage of the resources and ideas of the rest of the world. There are sharp limits
to productivity gains that can be gained through forced labor.
Brock may respond that this exaggerates the burden caused by a couple of years of
compulsory service. This may be correct, but we should keep in mind that
compulsory service should in most circumstances be a temporary measure on the
path to a well-functioning, prosperous, and just community. We should consider
carefully to what extent such a community can be built on policies that abridge
rights. Coercive means may undermine the very good we hope to achieve.
So far, I have expressed empirical reservations about compulsory service
producing the envisioned outcomes. I turn now to normative concerns. One
unfortunate tendency of the ‘brain drain’ debates is that they tend to treat workers
as factors of production to be moved where they are expected to do the most good.
Workers are subsumed under what Iris Young dubbed the ‘distributive paradigm’ as
benefits to be allocated.16 An advantage of considering the topic from the perspective
of productive justice is that it brings our attention back to the workers as people with
plans, hopes, and ambitions. If we focus on the conditions under which people
produce goods, rather than asking if they are producing enough goods, then we will
insist that a regime that meets the standard set by productive justice must not only
produce enough goods but also do so in ways that respect the rights and freedoms of
workers and fairly compensates them for their labor. We should balk at labeling ‘just’
a society that produces its wealth on the backs of indentured laborers, even if the
forced labor is temporary and performed under acceptable conditions.17 The focus
on ‘brain drain’ threatens to reduce productive justice to a desired outcome without
sufficiently acknowledging that justice is also a matter of the means by which this
outcome is achieved.
There is a further, instrumental reason for not underestimating the importance of
exit rights for securing just working conditions. The fact that temporary workers in
the kafala system in the Middle East and domestic workers in Asia are often
prohibited from changing employers plays a major role in human rights abuses.18
When constructing models to support policy interventions, we should be sensitive
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not only to the desired outcome but also to the indirect ethical consequences. The
willingness to override rights to achieve a laudable end may sometimes be justifiable
if the circumstances are dire enough, but we should contemplate the consequences
that this may have.19 These consequences may affect the workers compelled to
remain by trapping them, in many cases along with their families, under morally
unacceptable conditions.
More drastically, the willingness to override rights to coercively achieve ends sits
uneasily with building and maintaining a regime in which core civil and political
rights are respected (recall that Brock insists that only these states are justified in
imposing emigration restrictions). We should keep in mind that regimes upholding
these rights can be fragile and a high negative net migration rate is a symptom
indicating that all may not be well. Though we should be wary of slippery slope
arguments, a willingness to abridge the freedom of some under some circumstances
for the greater good may well make it easier to further abridge civil and political
rights necessary in the long term for justice and prosperity.
Thinking about compulsory service in the context of productive justice should
encourage a more holistic approach, reflecting on the multiple causes of deprivation
and the measures we can realistically take to ameliorate them.20 Before restricting
emigration, we should ask why people are leaving and what can be done to make
them more likely to choose to stay. Development is a process fraught with challenges
and setbacks, including setbacks caused by policies that do not exemplify the
character of the society that we hope to build. Fundamental human rights such as the
right to emigration and the freedom from compulsory labor should only be abridged
when other means have been attempted, there is a high likelihood that coercive
measures will succeed, and the end indeed justifies the means. My conviction is that
when we think about ‘brain drain’ in the larger context of productive justice,
compulsory service ceases to be an attractive option.
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